Lombardi, Michele and Yoshihara, Naoki (2011): Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results.
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This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a non-consequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially honest agents, which presume that there exists at least one individual in the society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that, in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results|
|English Title:||Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results|
|Keywords:||Nash implementation, canonical-mechanisms, s-mechanisms, self-relevant mechanisms, partial-honesty, permissive results.|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Michele Lombardi|
|Date Deposited:||17. Feb 2011 18:21|
|Last Modified:||21. Feb 2013 08:42|
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