Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium

Dai, Meixing and Sidiropoulos, Moïse (2011): Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium.

Abstract

In a Stackelberg equilibrium, central bank opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces the government to reduce taxes and public expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and output distortions. This effect could disappear or be dominated by the direct effect of opacity when the fiscal and monetary authorities play a Nash game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Distortionary taxes, output distortions, central bank transparency (opacity), fiscal disciplining effect.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H30 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy

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