di Iasio, Giovanni and Quagliariello, Mario (2011): Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation.
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Abstract
Following a decline in the fundamental risk of assets, the ability of banks to expand the balance sheet under a Value-at-Risk constraint in- creases (as in Adrian and Shin (2010)), boosting the bank’s incentives to provide costly monitoring effort that prevents asset deterioration. On the other hand, high asset demand and prices, eventually, raise the bank’s pay- off in the event of liquidation associated to asset deterioration, jeopardiz- ing incentives. This paper shows that a microprudential regulatory regime that disregards the equilibrium effect of macro variables (asset prices) on micro behavior (effort), performs poorly as low fundamental (exogenous) risk reduces bank’s effort and induces high (endogenous) deterioration risk. This analysis calls for a macroprudential regulatory regime in which the equilibrium feedback effect is fully taken into account by the author- ity in designing incentive compatible capital requirements, providing a theoretical foundation to the countercyclical buffer of Basel III.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Macroprudential regulation, financial stability, capital requirement. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy |
Item ID: | 30769 |
Depositing User: | GIOVANNI DI IASIO |
Date Deposited: | 07 May 2011 14:28 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 05:30 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/30769 |