A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem.

Abstract

This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Quantum game theory; Algorithmic Bayesian mechanism; Revelation principle; Revenue equivalence theorem.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions

References

1. H. Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat ``bad'' social choice rules. \emph{International Journal of Quantum Information}, \textbf{9} (2011) 615-623.\\ http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294

2. H. Wu, On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. \emph{Theoretical Computer Science}, 2011 (submitted).\\ http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.5327

3. H. Wu, Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle. \emph{Quantum Information Processing}, 2011 (submitted).\\ http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.0471

4. Y. Narahari, D. Garg, R. Narayanam and H. Prakash, Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions. Springer-Verlag, London, 2009.

5. R. Serrano, The theory of implementation of social choice rules, \emph{SIAM Review} \textbf{46} (2004) 377-414.

6. Mas-Colell, A., MD Whinston, and JR Green, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.