Barreto Nieto, Carlos Alberto (2010): Modelo de Unión Público-Privado: una aproximación desde la Teoría de Contratos.
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In the adjudication of several stages of an infrastructure project to develop a public service, when there is only private participation, there are strong incentives to reduce costs over the life of the project, which may affect the quality of service. In this paper, after a model extension to Hart (2003), is evaluated in more detail the advantages of the concession model, considering different classes of property in its implementation and introducing a simple mechanism to renegotiate, concluding that participation government is not justified for their ability to make innovations in quality, but because it is a mechanism to internalize the costs and benefits that may result in investment to reduce cost by the private party.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Modelo de Unión Público-Privado: una aproximación desde la Teoría de Contratos|
|English Title:||Public Private-Partnership: an approach from contract theory|
|Keywords:||Teoría de contratos, Unión Público Privado, Privatización|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R4 - Transportation Economics > R42 - Government and Private Investment Analysis ; Road Maintenance ; Transportation Planning
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
|Depositing User:||Carlos Alberto Barreto Nieto|
|Date Deposited:||07 Jul 2011 08:19|
|Last Modified:||25 Feb 2016 04:07|
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