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Consistency in (Super-)Majority Decision

Xefteris, Dimitrios (2010): Consistency in (Super-)Majority Decision.

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This paper identifies necessary and sufficient single-profile conditions for consistent decision under all super-majority rules. It is demonstrated that if one begins by discarding any ordering and its inverse whenever they are both found in the preference profile, then the reduced profile will generate a transitive super-majority rule relation if and only if it is not balanced enough relative to the size of the super-majority.

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