Nehring, Klaus and Pivato, Marcus and Puppe, Clemens (2011): Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and pathdependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions.

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Abstract
Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice where the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (`views') on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/noissues. Unfortunately, simply complying with the majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collection of judgements. Thus, we consider the Condorcet set: the set of logically consistent views which agree with the majority in as many issues as possible. Any element of this set can be obtained through a process of diachronic judgement aggregation, where the evaluations of the individual issues are decided through a sequence of majority votes unfolding over time, with earlier decisions possibly imposing logical constraints on later decisions. Thus, for a fixed profile of votes, the ultimate social choice can depend on the order in which the issues are decided; this is called path dependence. We investigate the size and structure of the Condorcet set and hence the scope and severity of pathdependence for several important classes of judgement aggregation problems.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and pathdependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  judgement aggregation; diachronic; pathdependence; indeterminacy; Condorcet; median rule; majoritarian 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations 
Item ID:  32434 
Depositing User:  Marcus Pivato 
Date Deposited:  27 Jul 2011 02:31 
Last Modified:  03 Oct 2019 01:50 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/32434 