Ndikimi i informacionit asimetrik në tregjet financiare

Govori, Fadil (2011): Ndikimi i informacionit asimetrik në tregjet financiare.

Abstract

Asymmetric information is a relevant concept for studying and understanding financial markets. In this paper we discus the effect of asymmetric information on the borrower–lender relationship. The presence of asymmetric information in financial markets leads to adverse selection, moral hazard, and monitoring costs. Adverse selection occurs when a lender is not capable of distinguishing between projects with different credit risk when allocating credit. Or, given the two projects with equal expected returns, the lender will prefer the safest one and the borrower the riskiest. Adverse selection occurs always at the phase of decision making process on credit allocation, that is, before the lender disburses the loan. It is understood that borrowers that undertake risky activities find it convenient to hide the true nature of a project, thereby exploiting the lender’s lack of information. When credit is allocated, there is another risk known as moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when borrower apply the funds to different uses than those agreed upon with the lender, who is one more time hindered by his lack of information and control over the borrower. As it is understood, moral hazard takes place after having conceded the capital. Finally, monitoring costs are tied to a hidden action by borrower, who takes advantage of his better information do declare lower than actual earnings.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The Impact of Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets
• Language: Albanian
• Keywords: Asymmetric information; adverse selection; monitoring costs; agency problem; financial markets
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance

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