Rational Democracy:A Political System for Universal Interest

Mo, Pak Hung (2012): Rational Democracy:A Political System for Universal Interest.

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate a political system that can satisfy certain desirable characteristics that include democratic participation, serving for universal interest, public sector efficiency, and sustainable by incentive compatibility and virtuous cycles. The system comprises a set of rules and organizations that provide motivations and supports to the participants for enhancing universal interest. It is a political structure that serves the people, rules by rationality, strives for efficiency and is sustainable. They will drive the society toward harmony and rapid growth in the quality of life for all.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Political System Design, Economic Development
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

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