Mutascu, Mihai and Tiwari, Aviral and Estrada, Fernando (2011): Taxation and political stability. Forthcoming in:
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Abstract
The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998), using a country-level panel data from 112 countries for the period 1997 to 2010. The main results show that political stability is not the key for the tax policy, under the control of political regime durability the taxes as percent in GDP having consistent sinusoidal tendency, by cubic type.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Taxation and political stability |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Taxation, Political Stability, Connection, Effects, GMM and GMM system |
Subjects: | B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925 B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models ; Single Variables > C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925 > B16 - Quantitative and Mathematical D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B41 - Economic Methodology C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models ; Single Variables |
Item ID: | 36855 |
Depositing User: | Fernando Estrada |
Date Deposited: | 24 Feb 2012 03:11 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 12:34 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/36855 |