Chilosi, Alberto (2010): Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_37177.pdf Download (321kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In the literature the issue of the protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is usually considered in a static context: how should the institutions of corporate governance be shaped having regard to already existing firms, conforming in particular to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. It is remarkable that no attention is usually paid to the basic fact that a company in order to exist must first be established, and that the founders-owners are the original shareholders. Moreover not necessarily the most appropriate protection of stakeholder interests can be provided by the institutions and practice of corporate governance, specific kinds of legal provisions may be more suitable. But rather than substitution complementarity prevails between different legal provisions protecting the interests of stakeholders (in particular employees) and the stakeholder protection afforded through the institutions of capital governance, conforming to the logic of the different "varieties of capitalism". An aspect of the latter that is emphasized in the paper, and is usually overlooked, are the much higher rates of long-term unemployment associated with the continental European variety as compared with the Liberal Market variety of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. But the Scandinavian Social-Democratic market model gives the best of both worlds: low long-term unemployment rates and incidence, together with high degrees of employment protection.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Stakeholders, Corporate Governance, Labour Market, Varieties of Capitalism, Long term unemployment |
Subjects: | K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K22 - Business and Securities Law G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P10 - General K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K31 - Labor Law |
Item ID: | 37177 |
Depositing User: | Alberto Chilosi |
Date Deposited: | 08 Mar 2012 00:36 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 16:54 |
References: | Aglietta M., Reberioux A. (2005), Corporate Governance Adrift. A Critique of Shareholder Value, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Allen F., Carletti E., Marquez R. (2009), ‘Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value’, Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper #09-28; http,//ssrn.com/abstract=968141. Amable B. (2003), The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press Amable B. (2009), ‘Structural Reforms in Europe and the (In)Coherence of Institutions’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25, 17–39 American Law Institute (1992), Principles of Corporate Governance, Analysis and Recommendations, Philadelphia, Author Andersen T. M., Holmström B, Honkapohja S., Korkman S, Söderström H. T., Vartiainen J. (2007), The Nordic Model, Embracing Globalization and Sharing Risks, Helsinki, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) Armour J., Deakin, S. (2009), ‘How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence From A Cross-Country Comparison Of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection’, Centre for Business Research, University Of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 382 Blair, M. M., Stout, L. A., ‘Specific Investment and Corporate Law’, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-30; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-31. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=869010, Dec. 2005 Berle A., Means G. C., (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, McMillan Black B., Kraakman R., Tarassova A. (2000), ‘Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?’, Stanford Law Review, 52, 1731-1808 Boyer, R. (1997), ‘French Statism at the Crossroads’, in Crouch C. and Streeck W. (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, London, Sage Brandeis L. D. (1914), Other People’s Money, And how the Bankers Use It, New York, Frederick A. Stokes. Available as electronic text at http,//www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/191 Calmors L., Driffil J. (1988), ‘Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance’, Economic Policy, 6, 13-47 Charreaux G., Desbrières P. (2001), ‘Corporate Governance , Stakeholder Value versus Shareholder Value’, Journal of Management and Governance, 5, 107–128 Chilosi A., Damiani M. (2007), ‘Stakeholders vs. Shareholders in Corporate Governance’, Icfai Journal of Corporate Governance, 6, 7 – 45; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975293 Chilosi A. (2001), ‘Entrepreneurship and Transition’, MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, 11, 327-357 Clark A., Postel-Vinay F. (2009), ‘Job Security and Job Protection’, Oxford Economic Papers 61, 207–239, doi:10.1093/oep/gpn017 Coles J. L., Daniel N. D., Naveen L. (2008), ‘Boards, Does One Size Fit All?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 329–356 Core J. E., Guay W. R., Rusticus T. O. (2006), ‘Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations’, The Journal of Finance, LXI, 655-687 Damiani M. (2011), ‘Labor Regulation in Shareholder and Stakeholder Economies’, in Blainpain R., Bromwich W., Rymkevich O., Senatori I. (eds), Rethinking Corporate Governance, From Shareholder Value to Stakeholder Value, Alphen, Kluwer Law International Damiani M., Pompei F. (2010), ‘Labour Protection and Productivity in EU Economies: 1995-2005’, European Journal of Comparative Economics, 7, 373-411 Damiani M., Pompei F., Ricci A. (2011), ‘Temporary Job Protection and Productivity Growth in EU Economies’. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793087 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.1793087 Djankov S. (2008), ‘The Regulation of Entry: A Survey’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Discussion Paper No. 70 Djankov S., La Porta R., López-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. (2008), ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’, Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 430–465 Donaldson T., Preston L. E. (1995), ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation, Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’, The Academy of Management Review, 20, 65-91. Stable URL: http,//www.jstor.org/stable/258887 Dyck A, Zingales L. (2004), ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’, Journal of Finance, 59, 537-600 Fauver L., Fuerst M..E. (2006), ‘Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards’, Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 673-710. Freeman R. B. (1988), ‘Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance’, Economic Policy, 3, 63-80. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344504 Freeman, R. E. (1984), Strategic Management.: A Stakeholder Approach, Boston, Pitman Freeman R. E., Evan W. M. (2001), ‘Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Interpretation’, The Journal of Behavioral Economics, 19, 337-359 Freeman R. E., McVea J. (2001), ‘A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management’, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration University of Virginia, Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001, available at http,//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=263511 Gatti D., Rault C., Vaubourg A. (2009), ‘Unemployment and Finance, How do Financial and Labour Market Factors Interact?’, Cesifo working paper no. 2901 Ginglinger E., Meggison W., Waxin T., (2009), ‘Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies’, ssrn working paper Grubb, D., J. Lee and P. Tergeist (2007), ‘Addressing Labour Market Duality in Korea’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 61, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/058184274204 Gugler K. (2001), ‘Conclusions and Policy Implications’, in Gugler K. (ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford, Oxford Un. Press Hall P.A., Soskice D. (2001), ‘Introduction’, in Hall P.A., Soskice D. (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press Hansmann, H. (1996), The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge (Mass.), Belknap Press of Harvard Un. Press (reprinted as paperback in 2000) Hopt K. (2011), ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation’, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law N° 170/2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1713750 Ilmakunnas P., Kanniainen V. (2001), ‘Entrepreneurship, Economic Risks, and Risk Insurance in the Welfare State: Results with OECD Data 1978–93’, German Economic Review, 2, 195–218, DOI: 10.1111/1468-0475.00034 ILO (2009), Key Indicators of the Labour Market, sixth edition (KILM6), http,//www.ilo.org/empelm/what/pubs/lang--en/WCMS_114060/index.htm Ilsøe A. (2010), ‘Between Trust and Control, Company-Level Bargaining on Flexible Working Hours in the Danish and German Metal Industries’, Industrial Relations Journal, 41, 34–51 Jensen M. C., Meckling W. H. (1979), ‘Rights and Production Functions, An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination’, The Journal of Business, 52, 469-506 Jensen M. C. (2010), ‘Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22, 32-42 (originally published in 2001) Koyama Y. (2010), ‘An Issue of Corporate Governance in Japan: For Whom Companies Exist?’, in Zarzadzanie Finansami: Analiza Finansowa i Zarzadzanie Ryzykiem, Szczecin, Uniwersytet Szczecinski, 367-381 Kraakman R.. Armour J., Davies P, Enriques L, Hansman H., Hertig G., Hopt, K., Kanda H., Rock E. (2009), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, Sec. Ed., Oxford, Oxford Un. Press La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1997), ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’,The Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-1150 La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1998), ‘Law and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155 Machin S., Manning A. (1999), ‘The Causes and Consequences of Longterm Unemployment in Europe’, in Ashenfelter O., Card D. (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Amsterdam, Elsevier Meese, A. J. (2002), ‘The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment”, William and Mary Law Review, 43, 1629. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=373783 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.373783 Morck R., Wolfenzon D., Yeung B. (2005), ‘Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth,’ Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 655-720 OECD (1998), Fostering Entrepreneurship, Paris, OECD OECD (2010), Indicators on Employment Protection - annual time series data 1985-2008, Version 2 - Last updated 24-09-2010, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/38/42773608.xls Pieroni, L, Signorelli (2002), ‘Labour Market Institutions and Employment Performance’, Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia Politica, 364, Siena, http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/quaderni/364.pdf Rajan R., Zingales L. (1998), ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’, The American Economic Review, 88, 559-586 Rappaport A. (1986), Creating Shareholder Value: The New Standard for Business Performance, New York, Free Press Schuster, E. (2010), ‘Efficiency in Private Control Sales: The Case for Mandatory Bids’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 08/2010 Shleifer A., Vishn R. W. (1997), ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, 52, 737-783 Sjåfjell B. (2009), Towards a Sustainable European Company Law, Alphen an den Rijn, Kluwer Skedinger P. (2010), Employment Protection Legislation: Evolution, Effects, Winners and Losers, Cheltenham, Elgar Schmitt J., Wadsworth J, (2005), ‘Is the OECD Jobs Strategy Behind U.S. and British Employment and Unemployment Success in the 1990s?’, in Howell D. (ed.) Fighting Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy, Oxford Oxford Un. Press Tachibanaki T., Taki A. (2000), Capital and Labour in Japan: the Functions of Two Actor Markets, Abingdon, Routledge Tachibanaki T., ed. (1998), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm, Cheltenham, Elgar The Economist (2012), ‘Special Report on State Capitalism’, The Economist, 22 January |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/37177 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the founders’ perspective, and the varieties of capitalism. (deposited 01 Oct 2010 19:29)
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the founders’ perspective, and the varieties of capitalism. (deposited 30 Apr 2011 02:55)
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the founders’ perspective, and the varieties of capitalism. (deposited 18 Jun 2011 18:35)
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment. (deposited 24 Oct 2011 19:40)
- Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment. (deposited 08 Mar 2012 00:36) [Currently Displayed]
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment. (deposited 24 Oct 2011 19:40)
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the founders’ perspective, and the varieties of capitalism. (deposited 18 Jun 2011 18:35)
-
Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the founders’ perspective, and the varieties of capitalism. (deposited 30 Apr 2011 02:55)