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On amending the Maskin's theorem by using complex numbers

Wu, Haoyang (2011): On amending the Maskin's theorem by using complex numbers.

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The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which agents may break through the Maskin's sufficiency theorem if the designer uses the Maskin's mechanism, i.e,. a social choice rule which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto may be not Nash implementable. The agreement is based on an algorithm with complex numbers. It is justified when the designer communicates with the agents through some channels (e.g., Internet). Since the designer cannot prevent the agents from signing such self-enforcing agreement, the Maskin's sufficiency theorem is amended.

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