Jellal, Mohamed and Garoupa, Nuno (2007): Information corruption and optimal law enforcement. Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics No. 23: 59-69 (2007)
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We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on o®enders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to o®set the negative e®ect on deterrence).
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Information corruption and optimal law enforcement|
|Keywords:||Fine, probability of detection and punishment, corruption, Information|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
|Depositing User:||Mohamed Jellal|
|Date Deposited:||28 Apr 2012 03:24|
|Last Modified:||15 Oct 2016 19:45|
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