The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process

Dai, Darong (2010): The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process.

Abstract

In this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game performances between the behavior- pattern “tit for tat” and the behavior-pattern “always defection”, proving that there exists a strictly positive probability, which has a close link with the discount factor, that a single TFT individual can fully invade into a group of ALLD individuals; that is to say, TFT has some kind of evolutionary stability.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: IPD; Evolutionary Game Dynamics; Equilibrium Selection
• Subjects: Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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