Dai, Darong (2012): Comparative Studies on Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game and Dynamic Sequential Game of Economic Maturity.
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Abstract
In the paper, we are encouraged to investigate the effect of game structure imposed on the minimum-time needed to economic maturity in a dynamic macroeconomic model. Indeed, we have established a basic framework for the comparative study of the cooperative stochastic differential game and dynamic sequential game of economic maturity. Moreover, in a simple stochastic growth model, closed-form solution of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity has been derived with the explicit condition, under which it is confirmed that cooperation between the representative household and the self-interested politician will definitely lead us to much faster economic maturity than that of sequential action, supplied, too. Finally, our model supports the comparative study of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity under different political- institution constraints.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Comparative Studies on Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game and Dynamic Sequential Game of Economic Maturity |
English Title: | Comparative Studies on Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game and Dynamic Sequential Game of Economic Maturity |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Economic maturity; Minimum-time objective; Political economy; Sequential equilibrium; Cooperative stochastic differential game |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General |
Item ID: | 44339 |
Depositing User: | darong dai |
Date Deposited: | 11 Feb 2013 05:37 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 04:57 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/44339 |