Lombardi, Michele and Yoshihara, Naoki
(2013):
*Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments.*

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## Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically rational agents and partially honest agents coexist. Firstly, assuming that there exists at least one partially honest agent in either the weak notion or the strong notion, the class of efficient social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable by such mechanisms is characterized. Secondly, the (unconstrained) Walrasian correspondence is shown to be implementable by such a mechanism when there is at least one partially honest agent of the strong type, which may provide a behavioral foundation for decentralized implementation of the Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, in this set-up, the effects of honesty on the implementation of more equitable Pareto optimal allocations can be viewed as negligible.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments |

English Title: | Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | Natural implementation, Nash equilibrium, exchange economies, intrinsic preferences for honesty. |

Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D04 - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations |

Item ID: | 48294 |

Depositing User: | Michele Lombardi |

Date Deposited: | 13 Jul 2013 19:58 |

Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 01:06 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/48294 |