Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure

Liu, Wai-Man and Ngo, Phong (2013): Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure.

Abstract

We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the hazard rate for banks operating in states where the governor has control of both the upper and lower house of the state legislature (i.e. complete political control) heading into an election falls by approximately 75%.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: bank failure, elections, political competition/control
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages

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