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Dynamic game model of endogenous growth with consumption externalities

Hori, Katsuhiko and Shibata, Akihisa (2009): Dynamic game model of endogenous growth with consumption externalities. Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications , Vol. 145, No. 1 (April 2010): pp. 93-107.

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Abstract

This paper introduces consumption externalities into an endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and characterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argument in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit "keeping up with the Joneses" or "running away from the Joneses".

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