Rational choice and the transitivity of betterness

Handfield, Toby (2013): Rational choice and the transitivity of betterness. Forthcoming in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Rational choice, transitivity, vagueness, status quo maintenance, incommensurate value
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D89 - Other

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