A Partner in Crime: Assortative Matching and Bias in the Crime Market

Gavrilova, Evelina (2013): A Partner in Crime: Assortative Matching and Bias in the Crime Market.

Abstract

In this paper I analyze partnership formation within the property crime market in the United States. I develop a static matching model, in which a criminal forms a partnership with a counterpart with the same probability of success. Using individual arrest data from the National Incident Based Reporting System, I pinpoint matches where the underlying ability of two partners differ. This difference in ability is correlated to observable characteristics, making the case for discrimination. By comparing the regression results to success means for the same demographic groups, I find patterns consistent with discrimination. Beside the patterns of gender and racial segregation, I find that in white-black matches, blacks outperform whites, consistent with success means. In male-female matches the female's success realization is higher than the male's, contrary to the difference in success means, where males on average outperform females, hinting at a distaste premium.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Assortative Matching, Bias, Crime, Discrimination, Organized Crime
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J7 - Labor Discrimination > J71 - Discrimination; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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