Majority judgment in an election with Borda majority count

Mohajan, Haradhan (2011): Majority judgment in an election with Borda majority count. Published in: International Journal of Management and Transformation , Vol. 6, No. 1 (30 June 2012): pp. 19-31.

Abstract

This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a method of election which is a new theory in social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them. The paper emphasize on the works of Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki majority judgment in an election. In Arrow’s impossibility theorem of social choice theory, the voters have to give a strictly preference ordering over the alternatives and hence they can not express indifference of the candidates. In the process of majority judgment the voters can express much more information than the Arrow’s process does but it is not free from counter-intuitive results. The Borda majority count avoids some counter-intuitive results and an attempt has been taken here to highlight them. The paper discusses both the advantages and drawbacks of the majority judgment in an election. Sometimes tie arises in majority judgment and different processes of tie-breaking are discussed with theoretical and mathematical calculations.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Majority voting, drawbacks in majority voting, manipulation of voting.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools

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