Islam, Jamal and Mohajan, Haradhan and Moolio, Pahlaj
(2010):
*Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting.*
Published in: International Journal of Management and Transformation
, Vol. 5, No. 1
(30 June 2011): pp. 10-34.

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## Abstract

In this paper an attempt has been taken to describe various types of voting system and manipulation of them. French philosophers Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) and Jeans-Charles Borda (1733-1799) introduced modern voting system. Duncan Black first introduced the manipulation of voting in 1958 in his book “Theory of Committee and Elections”. Condorcet, Borda and even many modern politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. In this paper this imperfection is analyzed in some detail. In this paper voting methods are discussed in very simple but in a detailed manner. Voting system is directly involved with Economics, Political Science and Social Science. So that if one has no proper knowledge of the voting system then he can not serve the society in proper way and cannot expect the economic development of the society. Some voting methods such as Arrow’s theorem, median voter theorem, randomized voting, Muller-Satterthwaite theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem are apparently non-manipulable and are included in this paper.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting |

English Title: | Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | Voting system, voting paradox, manipulation of voting, Condorcet winner, dictatorship, strategy-proofness. |

Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models ; Multiple Variables |

Item ID: | 50854 |

Depositing User: | Haradhan Kumar Mohajan |

Date Deposited: | 22 Oct 2013 06:32 |

Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 16:39 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/50854 |