New Housing Supply and the Dilution of Social Capital

Hilber, Christian A. L. (2007): New Housing Supply and the Dilution of Social Capital.

Abstract

This paper examines the role of local housing market conditions for social capital accumulation and neighborhood club good provision. A model of individual investment decisions predicts that in a setting with high property transaction costs (i) homeowners are more likely to invest in social capital than renters and (ii) the positive link between homeownership and social capital is stronger in more built-up neighborhoods with inelastic supply of new housing. In these neighborhoods homeowners are largely protected from inflows of newcomers that would dilute the net benefit from social capital in the longer run. Empirical evidence from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey confirms the model predictions. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that the effects are causal.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: London School of Economics
• Language: English
• Keywords: House price capitalization; social capital; homeownership; land and housing supply; neighborhood club goods
• Subjects: R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R2 - Household Analysis > R21 - Housing Demand; R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location > R31 - Housing Supply and Markets; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

References

References

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