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Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

Dietrich, Franz (2013): Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation.

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Abstract

When individual judgments ('yes' or 'no') on some propositions are aggregated into collective judgments, the agenda setter can sometimes reverse a collective judgment by changing the set of propositions under consideration (the agenda). I define different kinds of agenda manipulation, and axiomatically characterize the aggregation rules immune to each kind. Two axioms emerge as central for preventing agenda manipulation: the familiar independence axiom, requiring propositionwise aggregation, and the axiom of implicit consensus preservation, requiring the respect of any (possibly implicit) consensus. I prove that these axioms can almost never be satisfied together by a (non-degenerate) aggregation rule.

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