Bahamin, Payam and Cebula, Richard and Foley, Maggie and Houmes, Robert (2011): The Demand for Treasury Securities at Auction. Published in: Academy of Economics and Finance Journal , Vol. 3, No. 1 (20 December 2012): pp. 23-32.
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Abstract
This study empirically analyzes the demand for Treasury securities at auctions over the period October 1998 through July 2010 from the perspective of bid composition and the influence of demand at auction on the secondary market. The results show that the demand at auction, measured by bid dispersion, is positively related to the bid-to-cover ratio but is negatively associated with the percentage of accepted competitive bids as well as the percentage of noncompetitive bids. Post-auction returns are positively related to demand at auction. The findings suggest the existence of arbitrage opportunities resulting from the price discrepancy between the auction and the secondary market when the demand for Treasury securities at auction is high.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Demand for Treasury Securities at Auction |
English Title: | The Demand for Treasury Securities at Auction |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Treasury securities; primary market bidding; secondary market bidding |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H62 - Deficit ; Surplus H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt |
Item ID: | 52026 |
Depositing User: | Richard Cebula |
Date Deposited: | 07 Dec 2013 05:06 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 04:42 |
References: | Cammack, E., 1991, Evidence of Bidding Strategies and Information in Treasury Bill Auctions, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, pp. 100-130. Chatterjea, A. and R. Jarrow, 1998, Market Manipulation, Price Bubbles and a Model of the U.S. Treasury Securities Auction Market, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, pp. 255–279. Fleming, M., 2007, Who Buys Treasury Securities at Auction? Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 1-7. Garbade, K. and J. Ingber, 2005, The Treasury Auction Process: Objectives, Structure, and Recent Adaptations, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 11, pp. 1-11. Godbout, L., P. Storer, and C. Zimmermann, 2002, The Canadian Treasury Bill Auction and the Term Structure of Interest Rates, Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 26, pp. 1165–1179. Goldreich, D., 2007, Under-pricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-price Treasury Auctions, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 42, pp. 443-466. Klemperer, P., 2002, What Really Matters in Auction Design, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, pp. 169–189. Nyborg, K. and S. Sundaresan, 1995, Discriminatory Versus Uniform Treasury Auctions: Evidence from When-Issued Transactions, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 63-104. Nyborg, K. and I. Sutrebulaev, 2004, Multiple Unit Auction and Short Squeezes, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 17, pp. 545–580. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/52026 |