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The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

Bakó, Barna and Tasnádi, Attila (2014): The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies.

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In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

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