Bakó, Barna and Tasnádi, Attila (2014): The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies.
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Abstract
In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Mixed duopoly, Cournot, Bertrand-Edgeworth. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Item ID: | 52986 |
Depositing User: | Attila Tasnádi |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jan 2014 17:05 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 12:46 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/52986 |