Dolmas, Jim (2014): Almost orthogonal outcomes under probabilistic voting: A cautionary example.
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Abstract
I illustrate by example a way in which equilibria under probabilistic voting are fragile with respect to assumptions about the non-policy components of voter preferences. I also offer intuition for the fragility using the social welfare functions which also describe the equilibria.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Almost orthogonal outcomes under probabilistic voting: A cautionary example |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Probabilistic voting; political economy |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation |
Item ID: | 53628 |
Depositing User: | Jim Dolmas |
Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2014 15:29 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 04:48 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/53628 |