On the Single-Valuedness of the Pre-Kernel

Meinhardt, Holger Ingmar (2014): On the Single-Valuedness of the Pre-Kernel.

Abstract

Based on results given in the recent book by Meinhardt (2013), which presents a dual characterization of the pre-kernel by a finite union of solution sets of a family of quadratic and convex objective functions, we could derive some results related to the uniqueness of the pre-kernel. Rather than extending the knowledge of game classes for which the pre-kernel consists of a single point, we apply a different approach. We select a game from an arbitrary game class with an unique pre-kernel satisfying the non-empty interior condition of a payoff equivalence class, and then establish that the set of related and linear independent games which are derived from this pre-kernel of the default game replicate this point also as its sole pre-kernel element. In the proof we apply results and techniques employed in the above work. Namely, we prove in a first step that the linear mapping of a pre-kernel element into a specific vector subspace of balanced excesses is unique. Secondly, that there cannot exist a different and non-transversal vector subspace of balanced excesses in which a linear transformation of a pre-kernel element can be mapped. Furthermore, we establish that on the restricted subset on the game space that is constituted by the convex hull of the default and the set of related games, the pre-kernel correspondence is single-valued, and therefore continuous. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions that preserves the pre-nucleolus property for related games even when the default game has not an unique pre-kernel.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Transferable Utility Game; Pre-Kernel; Uniqueness; Convex Analysis; Fenchel-Moreau Conjugation; Indirect Function
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

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