Bhowmik, Anuj (2014): Core and Coalitional Fairness: The Case of Information Sharing Rule.
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Abstract
We investigate two of the most extensively studied cooperative notions in a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information. One of them is the core and the other is known as coalitional fairness. The set of agents is modelled by a mixed market consisting of some large agents and an ocean of small agents; and the commodity space is an ordered Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point. The information system in our framework is the one introduced by Allen in [1]. Thus, the same agent can have common, private or pooled information when she becomes member of different coalitions. It is shown that the main results in Grodal [20], Schmeidler [26] and Vind [31] can be established when the economy consists of a continuum of small agents. We also focus on the information mechanism based on size of coalitions introduced in [18] and obtain a result similar to the main result in [18]. Finally, we examine the concept of coalitional fairness proposed in [21]. We prove that the core is contained in the set of coalitionally fair allocations under some assumptions. This result provides extensions of Theorem 2 in [21] to an economy with asymmetric information as well as a deterministic economy with infinitely many commodities. Although we consider a general commodity space, all our results were so far unsolved to the case of information sharing rule with finitely many commodities.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Core and Coalitional Fairness: The Case of Information Sharing Rule |
English Title: | Core and Coalitional Fairness: The Case of Information Sharing Rule |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Asymmetric information economy; coalitional fairness; core; information sharing rule. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design |
Item ID: | 56644 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Anuj Bhowmik |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2014 00:14 |
Last Modified: | 13 Oct 2019 21:35 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/56644 |
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