Diaspora transferts et signal de richesse

Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Diaspora transferts et signal de richesse.

Abstract

This paper shows that social interactions can induce families of migrants to care about hierarchical social status because it serves as a signal device of non-observable income. Hence , a concern for social status induces theses families to engage in conspicuous consumption in order to signal their relative wealth. Consequently, the model shows a positive correlation between disposable income and consumption of the positional good . As a corollary, families who receive large remittances tendto invest more in the signaling game of wealth.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Diaspora remittances and signaling wealth game
• Language: French
• Keywords: Diaspora, Remittances, Status Seeking, Conspicuous Consumption, Signaling game
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F22 - International Migration; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F24 - Remittances; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology

References

Bagwell, Laurie Simon, and B. Douglas Bernheim, 1996, Veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption, American Economic Review 86, 349–73.

Becker, Gary S., Kevin M. Murphy, and Ivan Werning, 2005, The equilibrium distribution of income and the market for status, Journal of Political Economy 113, 282–310.

Becker, Gary S., and Luis Rayo, 2006, Peer Comparisons and Consumer Debt, The University of Chicago Law Review, 73, 231-248.

Bloch, Francis, Vijayendra Rao, and Sonalde Desai, 2004, Wedding Celebrations as conspicuous consumption: Signaling social status in rural India, Journal of Human Resources, 39(3), 675-95.

Chung, Ed and Eileen Fischer 2001, When Conspicuous Consumption Becomes Inconspicuous:The Case of Migrant Hong Kong Consumers, Journal of Consumer Marketing, 18(6), 474-87.

Clark, Andrew E., and Andrew J. Oswald, 1996, Satisfaction and Comparison Income, Journal ofPublic Economics56, 359–381.

Cole, Harold, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite, 1992, Social norms, savings behavior and growth, Journal of Political Economy 100, 1092–1126.

Cole, Harold, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite, 1995, Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 13(9), 12–21.

Corneo,G., and O.Jeanne, . 1997, On relative wealth effects and ptimality of grotwh, Economics Letters, 54, 87-92.

Corneo, G., and O. Jeanne ,1997 ,Conspicuous Consumption, Snobbism and Conformism, Journal of Public Economics 66, 55-71.

Corneo, Giacomo, and Olivier Jeanne, 1998, Social organization, status, and savings behavior,Journal of Public Economics 70, 37–51.

Duesenberry, James S., 1949, Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA).

Frank, Robert H., 1985, The demand for unobservable and other nonpositional goods, American Economic Review 75, l0l-116.

Glazer, Amihai and Kai Konrad, 1996, A signaling explanation for private charity, American Economic Review 86(4), 1019-1028.

Hopkins, Ed, and Tatiana Kornienko, 2004, Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status, American Economic Review 94(4), 1085-1107.

Ireland, Norman, 1994, On Limiting the Market for Status Signals, Journal of Public Economics, 53, 91-110.

Jella, Mohamed et Taoufik Rajhi, 2003 Statut Social et Croissance, Revue d’économie Politique.

Jellal ,M. 2014, Behavioral Economics of Remittances , miméo Al Makrîzi Institut d’économie, Rabat

Jellal ,M. , 2014, Remittances under Incomplete Information ’’, miméo Al Makrîzi Institut d’économie, Rabat

Jellal ,M. , 2014 , Remittances Uncertainty and Prudence ’’, miméo Al Makrîzi Institut d’économie, Rabat

Jellal ,M. , 2014, Identity Assimilation and Remittances ’’, miméo Al Makrîzi Institut d’économie, Rabat

Layard, R.,1980, Human satisfaction and public policy, Economic Journal, 94,737-750.

Leibenstein, H. ,1950, Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen e.ects in the theory of consumer’s demand, Quartely Journal of Economics, 64, 183-207.

Kahneman, Daniel and Alan Krueger,2006, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1), 3-24.

Luttmer, Erzo. F. P., 2005, Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 963–1002.

McBride, Michael, 2001, Relative-income effects on subjective well-being in the cross-section, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 45, 251–278.

Pollack, Robert A, 1976, Interdependent preferences, American Economic Review 66, 309–20.

Rauscher, M. 1997 , Conspicuous Consumption, E onomi Growth and Taxation, Journal of Eonomics , 66,3542.

Smith, Adam, 1759, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Repr., New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969.

Spence, Micheal. 1973. Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87(3) ,355-374

Veblen, Thorstein, 1899, The theory of the leisure class: an economic study of institutions. Repr.,Kila, MT: Kessinger, 2004.