A Theory of Political Accountability and Journalism

Bruns, Christian and Himmler, Oliver (2014): A Theory of Political Accountability and Journalism.

Abstract

Journalism is widely believed to be crucial for holding elected officials accountable. At the same time economic theory has a hard time providing a straightforward explanation for the phenomenon of "accountability journalism". According to the common Downsian reasoning, rational voters should not be willing to pay for information out of purely instrumental motives because the individual probabilities of casting the decisive vote are typically very low. We show that this rationale does not apply when a group of voters shares a common goal such as accountability and information is delivered via mass media. In contrast to the pessimistic Downsian view, rational voters can have a considerable willingness to pay journalists for the provision of instrumental information in these scenarios. Our model thus reconciles the rational voter approach with the common perception of journalism as a watchdog that holds elected officials accountable. We also show that competition does not lead to more information and accountability, and that entertainment can crowd out informative media content.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: accountability, elections, information, media
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software

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