Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel and Kovenock, Dan and Sheremeta, Roman (2014): A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments. Forthcoming in: Experimental Economics

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_59714.pdf

Download (645kB) | Preview

Abstract

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.