The Public Choice and the traditional view of political science

Vicini, Andrea (2011): The Public Choice and the traditional view of political science.

Abstract

This article, explore the origin of public choice compared with the traditional view of political science. The emphasize is on the methodology and the initial research program developed by Buchanan and Tullock.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Public Choice, Gordon Tullock, James Buchanan.
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H0 - General > H00 - General; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H70 - General

References

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J. M. Buchanan (2003). Politics without Romance, Policy Vol. 19 No. 3, Spring 2003.

J. M. Buchanan, G. Tullock (1999). Politics and the Economic Nexus, 1999.

P. Lemieux (2004). The Public Choice Revolution, Regulation, Fall 2004.

G. Tullock (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (3) 1967.

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