Enterprise-level bargaining and labour productivity of Italian family firms: a quantile regression analysis

Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2014): Enterprise-level bargaining and labour productivity of Italian family firms: a quantile regression analysis.

Abstract

We investigate the role of Italian firms to evaluate their role on labour productivity performance. We find that family owned firms are less efficient than their no-family counterparts and also that family management negatively affects labour productivity. Furthermore, we estimate the role of firm level bargaining to verify whether family controlled firms, adopting these types of agreements, may partially close their efficiency gap with respect to their competitors. We find that enterprises under family governance obtain significant efficiency gains when they adopt firm level bargaining, greater than those obtained by their no-family counterparts.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Family firms, corporate governance, labour productivity
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods

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