Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination

Dittrich, Dennis Alexis Valin and Büchner, Susanne and Kulesz, Micaela Maria (2014): Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_60998.pdf

Download (243kB) | Preview

Abstract

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.