Harless, Patrick (2014): A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance.

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Abstract
School assignment procedures aim to improve student welfare, but must balance efficiency and equity goals and provide incentives for students to report their preferences truthfully. Debate centers largely on two rules: immediate acceptance (IA), the socalled Boston mechanism, and deferred acceptance (DA). IA's strength is efficiency, while DA is touted for its superior strategic properties. Thinking of these as extremes, we advocate a compromise rule, immediateacceptancewithskips (IA+), which slightly modifies IA to achieve better strategic properties while retaining efficiency. IA+ proceeds in rounds of applications and, like IA, �finalizes assignments in each round. However, unlike IA or DA, IA+ allows students to "skip" applications to schools with no remaining capacity. We show that IA+ is efficient and less manipulable than IA+. Unfortunately, IA+ violates solidarity properties that both IA and DA satisfy. Considering robustness, we �find that each of the three rules satisfies a different set of three natural invariance properties.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  School choice; deferred acceptance; immediate acceptance; immediateacceptancewithskips; Boston mechanism 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D63  Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H  Public Economics > H7  State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H75  State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions I  Health, Education, and Welfare > I2  Education and Research Institutions > I28  Government Policy 
Item ID:  61417 
Depositing User:  Patrick Harless 
Date Deposited:  18 Jan 2015 07:58 
Last Modified:  26 Sep 2019 08:07 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/61417 