Duddy, Conal and Piggins, Ashley and Zwicker, William (2014): Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Bordalike approach.

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Abstract
We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations  equivalently, dichotomous weak orders  similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to aggregation by Wilson (J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975) 6377). In this setting we characterize the "mean rule," which we derive from properties similar to those Young (J. Econ. Theory 9 (1974) 4352) used in his characterization of the Borda rule. Complementing our axiomatic approach is a derivation of the mean rule using vector decomposition methods that have their origins in Zwicker (Math. Soc. Sci. 22 (1991) 187227). Finally, we derive the mean rule from an approach to judgment aggregation recently proposed by Dietrich (Soc. Choice. Welf. 42 (2014) 873911)
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Bordalike approach 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Binary evaluations, judgment aggregation, mean rule, tension, Borda. 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D70  General D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations 
Item ID:  62071 
Depositing User:  Dr Ashley Piggins 
Date Deposited:  13 Feb 2015 12:25 
Last Modified:  27 Sep 2019 15:34 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/62071 