Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach

Duddy, Conal and Piggins, Ashley and Zwicker, William (2014): Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach.

Abstract

We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations -- equivalently, dichotomous weak orders -- similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to aggregation by Wilson (J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975) 63-77). In this setting we characterize the "mean rule," which we derive from properties similar to those Young (J. Econ. Theory 9 (1974) 43-52) used in his characterization of the Borda rule. Complementing our axiomatic approach is a derivation of the mean rule using vector decomposition methods that have their origins in Zwicker (Math. Soc. Sci. 22 (1991) 187-227). Finally, we derive the mean rule from an approach to judgment aggregation recently proposed by Dietrich (Soc. Choice. Welf. 42 (2014) 873-911)

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Binary evaluations, judgment aggregation, mean rule, tension, Borda.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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