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On bargaining sets for finite economies

Hervés-Estévez, Javier and Moreno-García, Emma (2014): On bargaining sets for finite economies.

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Abstract

We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks to the set of Walrasian allocations.

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