Gómez-Rúa, María and Vidal-Puga, Juan
(2015):
*A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations.*

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## Abstract

We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, so that the planner can identify the agents that merge. Under this new framework, and as opposed to the traditional model, there exist rules that satisfy merge-proofness. Besides, by strengthening this property and adding some other properties, such as population-monotonicity and solidarity, we characterize a unique rule that coincides with the weighted Shapley value of an associated cost game.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | Minimum cost spanning tree problems, cost sharing, core selection, cost-monotonicity, merge-proofness, weighted Shapley value. |

Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making |

Item ID: | 62923 |

Depositing User: | María Gómez-Rúa |

Date Deposited: | 18 Mar 2015 10:01 |

Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 02:48 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/62923 |