In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective

Hinloopen, Jeroen and Smrkolj, Grega and Wagener, Florian (2013): In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective.

Abstract

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Antitrust policy, Bifurcations, Collusion, R&D cooperatives, Spillovers
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O38 - Government Policy

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