Pouvoir syndical et régulation des firmes multinationales

Jellal, Mohamed (2015): Pouvoir syndical et régulation des firmes multinationales.

Abstract

Our paper examines a set of regulation of a multinational firm with salary negotiation with a local union. Especially, we have shown that the government can extract informational rent of the multinational firm through collective bargaining process. Our theoretical analysis is the first step in the introduction of collective bargaining in the regulatory of regulation of multinational firms

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Trade union power and regulation of multinational firms
• Language: French
• Keywords: Trade union, negociation, multinational firm, regulation, information, Incentives , Mechanism design
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business; F - International Economics > F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization > F61 - Microeconomic Impacts; F - International Economics > F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization > F63 - Economic Development; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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