Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Leadership with Individual Rewards and Punishments

Gürerk, Özgür and Lauer, Thomas and Scheuermann, Martin (2015): Leadership with Individual Rewards and Punishments.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_65691.pdf

Download (557kB) | Preview

Abstract

In a public goods experiment, leaders with reward or punishment power induce higher team cooperation compared to leader-free teams without any reward or punishment possibilities. When equipped with reward or punishment instruments, however, leader-free teams perform as well as teams with leaders.We conclude that the instruments as such are more effective in fostering cooperation than a leader.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.