Arrow’un İmkânsızlık Teoremi İle Kafkasya’daki Sorunların Analizi

Dogru, Bulent (2013): Arrow’un İmkânsızlık Teoremi İle Kafkasya’daki Sorunların Analizi.

Abstract

This paper aims to prove, by Arrow impossibility theorem of choice, why three fundamental problems which are issues for Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaycan-neglecting regions’s other less problematic subjects and countries of Caucas- can not be solved. This study shows that when these countries try to solve qestions between them as trio without changing preferences ranking function of eachself, solution is impossible, paradoxial and unresolved. The only way to overcome all these restricted issues is that Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan should put whole matters on the desk by a well designed mechanism having both economic and politic aspects

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Analysis of Problems In Caucasıa Using Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
• Language: Turkish
• Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem of choice , mechanism design, Caucasia Region
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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