Teoría de Elección Racional: estructura conceptual y evolución reciente.

Abitbol, Pablo and Botero, Felipe (2006): Teoría de Elección Racional: estructura conceptual y evolución reciente. Published in: Colombia Internacional No. 62 : pp. 132-145.

Abstract

This article hopes to facilitate dialogue within political studies by presenting a general description of the conceptual structure of Rational Choice Theory, RCT. The main goal is to present precisely and concretely the basic precepts of RCT both on its original formulation and on the adjustments that have been adopted in reply to internal and external critiques.Thus, it presents a brief discussion about how the acknowledgement of the theory’s limitations has guided some aspects of its recent evolution. The article concludes with some brief reflections on the usefulness of RCT in political science, not aimed at discussing the applicability of RCT in the social sciences, a discussion beyond the scope of the paper, but to initiate a discussion about how RCT constitutes itself as a theoretical framework that facilitates dialogue within the discipline.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Rational Choice Theory: conceptual structure and recent evolution.
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: Rational choice theory, expected utility, symbolic utility, evidentially expected utility, causally expected utility, decisional value, rationality
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B40 - General; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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