Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure

Proctor, Adrian (2015): Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure. Published in: World Competition , Vol. 4, No. 38 (2015): pp. 571-596.

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Abstract

This article compares and contrasts the approach to merger issues in vertical and conglomerate cases including likely efficiencies, useful data, and the approach to looking at each of ability, incentive, and effect in turn. The paper considers when conglomerate mergers are more likely to mirror vertical cases and result in static price rises. The article considers the relationship between conglomerate foreclosure and predatory pricing to determine whether merger analysis is the most suitable place to intervene and stop short-term benefits that may harm competition in the longer term. Finally, potential amendments to the existing framework are discussed.

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