Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure

Proctor, Adrian (2015): Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure. Published in: World Competition , Vol. 4, No. 38 (2015): pp. 571-596.

Abstract

This article compares and contrasts the approach to merger issues in vertical and conglomerate cases including likely efficiencies, useful data, and the approach to looking at each of ability, incentive, and effect in turn. The paper considers when conglomerate mergers are more likely to mirror vertical cases and result in static price rises. The article considers the relationship between conglomerate foreclosure and predatory pricing to determine whether merger analysis is the most suitable place to intervene and stop short-term benefits that may harm competition in the longer term. Finally, potential amendments to the existing framework are discussed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Conglomerate merger vertical foreclosure competition price discrimination
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

References

Adrian J. “Conglomerate Mergers: Lessons from Vertical Foreclosure” World Competition 38.4 (2015): 571–596.

Proctor, Adrian J. "Identifying Geographic or Customer Based Collusion." World Competition 38.2 (2015): 253-280

Proctor, Adrian J. "TACIT COLLUSION INDICATORS IN MERGER CONTROL UNDER VARIED FOCAL POINTS." Journal of Competition Law and Economics 10.4 (2014): 959-987.

The analysis of conglomerate effects in EU merger control, Damien Neven, December 2005. Advances in the Economics of Competition Law”, MIT Press. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/conglomerate.pdf