Böckerman, Petri and Skedinger, Per and Uusitalo, Roope (2015): Seniority rules, worker mobility and wages: Evidence from multi-country linked employer-employee data.
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Abstract
We construct a multi-country employer-employee data to examine the consequences of employment protection. We identify the effects by comparing worker exit rates between units of the same firm that operate in two countries that have different seniority rules. The results show that last-in-first-out rules reduce dismissals of older, more senior workers, especially in shrinking multinational firms, and increase their bargaining power, resulting in a steeper seniority-wage profile.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Seniority rules, worker mobility and wages: Evidence from multi-country linked employer-employee data |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Multi-country linked employer-employee data, Employment protection legislation, Seniority rules |
Subjects: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J0 - General > J08 - Labor Economics Policies J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J63 - Turnover ; Vacancies ; Layoffs K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K31 - Labor Law K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L50 - General |
Item ID: | 68581 |
Depositing User: | Petri Böckerman |
Date Deposited: | 30 Dec 2015 14:24 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 14:36 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/68581 |