Social Connections and Cultural Heterogeneity

WU, JIABIN (2016): Social Connections and Cultural Heterogeneity.

Abstract

This paper proposes a cultural evolutionary model in which the assortativity level of matching is endogenously determined. We consider a population consisting of two cultural groups. Each group has a leader who can actively exert effort to enhance social connections among group members. Social connections increase the agents' probabilities of matching with one another among the same group in economic activities and thus increase the assortativity of matching in the population. We find that the endogenous process by which the assortativity level is determined can lead to cultural heterogeneity. While cultural homogeneity is the only prediction when the assortativity level is constant.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cultural evolution, social connections, cultural heterogeneity, assortative matching, evolutionary game theory.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification

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