Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited

Dubra, Juan (2006): Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited.

Abstract

I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of (potentially) asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights the economic content of what it takes to obtain efficient ex post equilibria. I generalize prior work by Echenique and Manelli (2006) and by Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). Relative to Krishna (2003), I weaken his single crossing properties, drop his differentiability and densities assumptions, but I assume that one player's valuation is weakly increasing in other players' signals, while he uses a different assumption (neither stronger nor weaker).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Efficiency; English Auctions; ex-post equilibrium
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

Birulin, O. and S. Izmalkov (2003) "On Efficiency of the English Auction," mimeo. c : Cassady, R. (1967). Auctions and Auctioneering. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (2000) "Efficient Auctions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), pp. 341-88.

Echenique, F. and A. Manelli (2006) "Comparative Statics, English Auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," No 1178 of 2003 of Caltech.

Krishna, V. (2003) "Asymmetric English Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory 112, pp. 261-88.

Maskin, E. (1992) "Auctions and Privatization," in H. Siebert (Ed.) Privatization, Institut fur Weltwirtschaften dr Universitat Kiel, Kiel, pp. 115-136.

McAfee, P. and J. McMillan (1987) "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature 25, 699-738.

Milgrom, P. (1989) "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 3-22.

Milgrom, P. and R. Weber (1982) "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica 50: 1089-1122.